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Ι LIFE AND WRITINGS 
Among the philosophers of late antiquity Plotinus stands out as a thinker of 
exceptional depth, subtlety, originality and power. His value was recognized 
already in his time by a leading critic in Athens, Longinus. Somewhat more 
than a century later, in the Latin West, Augustine praised Plotinus as a Plato 
revived and Eunapius testified to the veneration for Plotinus among Platonists in 
the Greek East.1 Some decades later, in Athens, Proclus devoted a commentary 
to Plotinus' work, a treatment he normally reserved for the highest philosophical 
authorities, such as Plato.2 But Plotinus was also something of an outsider. He 
taught in Rome, in a group that gathered around him, not in a school in one 
of the major cities for philosophical studies, Athens and Alexandria. He was 
criticized by Athenian professors. His group dispersed before his death and the 
strong school traditions which developed in Athens and Alexandria in the fifth 
and sixth centuries had other roots. Yet even if standing outside the educational 
institutions of late-antique philosophy, Plotinus' work provided this philosophy 
with fundamental ideas, in the absence of which, and despite various doctrinal 
differences, late-antique Platonism is hardly conceivable (see below, 2(e)). This 
impact was made possible in large part by the mediation of Plotinus' pupil 
Porphyry. Since it is through Porphyry that we have almost all of what we 
know of Plotinus' life and of what we have of his work, we might begin by 
considering the manner in which Porphyry conveyed to us the life and works 
of his teacher. 
It is towards the beginning of the fourth century, some thirty years after 
Plotinus' death, that Porphyry published a biography of Plotinus (On the Life of 
Plotinus and the Order of his Works3), together with, and as a preface to, his edition 
of Plotinus' works (the Enneadi), the edition which became authoritative and 
1
 Porphyry, Life 19-20; Aug. Conic Acad. 3.18.41; Eunap.Kf. soph. 455. 
2
 For surviving fragments of this commentary see Westerink 1959. 3 Henceforth Life. 
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has come down to us. It has been suggested that with this publication Porphyry 
was reacting to a new challenge which had developed at the turn of the fourth 
century, the challenge to Plotinus' heritage represented by the successful school 
founded in Apamea in Syria by Porphyry's former pupil, now a determined 
critic both of himself and of Plotinus, Iamblichus.4 If this is so, then the way 
in which Porphyry presented Plotinus' life and work was conditioned to some 
extent by the demands of his polemic with Iamblichus. We feel this perhaps in 
the portrait Porphyry gives us in the Life of Plotinus as an ideal sage, possessing 
every virtue, a paradigm of philosophical perfection, living the divine life which 
might be reached by those who read the Plotinian texts which follow the Life. 
Plotinus' divine-like nature is attested by various anecdotes (Life eh. io) and 
by a lengthy oracle delivered (post mortem) by Apollo (ch. 22), testimonials as 
impressive as anything Iamblichus could come up with in his portrayal of his 
ideal sage, Pythagoras, in On the Pythagorean Life. It is perhaps in this light that we 
might read Porphyry's opening words in the Life that Plotinus 'seemed ashamed 
of being in the body', an attitude which hindered him from speaking about 
his origins, parents and native country, which made him refuse the making 
of a portrait or bust of him (a refusal curiously betrayed by his faithful pupil 
Amelius) and which eventually led to a neglect of his body such that sickness 
followed and death. In all this we might feel some hagiographical exaggeration 
on Porphyry's part: shame and gross neglect of the body, the instrument of the 
soul, are not what Plotinus advocates (see below, 2 (d), vi). 
It is thanks to another pupil of Plotinus, Eustochius, a doctor who attended 
Plotinus when, retired on a country estate outside Rome, he died in 270, that 
Porphyry knew that Plotinus was sixty-six years old at the time. Eustochius 
also told Porphyry of Plotinus' last words: 'Try to bring the divine in us to 
the divine in the All.'5 If Porphyry says that Plotinus would not talk about his 
background, he can at least tell us that Plotinus began his study of philoso-
phy in Alexandria at the age of twenty-eight, being disappointed until finding 
Ammonius, a teacher who made a deep and lasting impression, Porphyry sug-
gests, on Plotinus, but about whom we know very little. After studying eleven 
4
 Saffrey 1992. 
5
 2.26—7. The precise wording and interpretation of Plotinus' last words are controversial: cf. d'Ancona 
2002. 
6
 For a collection and critical assessment of ancient reports on Ammonius, see Schwyzer 1983. 
Longinus puts Ammonius in the group of philosophers who contented themselves with oral, rather 
than written, transmission of their doctrines (Porphyry, Life 20.25—36). Much of what is reported 
about Ammonius (for example in Hierocles and Nemesius) seems to be Porphyrian in origin and 
sometimes reflects Porphyry's own views. However. Porphyry did not know Ammonius. It is thus 
very difficult to be sure about what really were Ammonius' views, even if it seems clear that Plotinus' 
philosophy, in some doctrinal aspects and in its general philosophical approach, must owe much to 
Ammonius (Life 3.33—5: 14.15—16). It seems that Ammonius attempted to unify the philosophy of 
Aristotle with that of Plato. 
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years with Ammonius, in 243 Plotinus joined the young Emperor Gordian Ill's 
military expedition against Persia, in search, Porphyry says (3.16—17), of Persian 
and Indian philosophy (we would expect nothing less from an ideal sage com-
parable to Pythagoras and Plato). The expedition was a failure, the emperor 
killed, but Plotinus managed to escape to Antioch and then settled in Rome 
in 244. 
An unofficial philosophical school developed around Plotinus in Rome, 
including close pupils and collaborators such as Amelius (from 246 to 269) and 
Porphyry (from 263 to 268), a group of devoted and regular members of the 
school such as Eustochius, and, since the school was open, more casual visitors. 
The devoted and regular members included senators, doctors, men of literature 
and women, in particular Gemina (perhaps the widow of the emperor Trebo-
nian) and her daughter who were Plotinus' hosts. Porphyry tells us that texts 
from Platonist and Aristotelian commentators of the second century were read 
in the lectures of the school (including Numenius, Atticus, Aspasius, Alexander 
of Aphrodisias) and that sometimes philosophical questions, such as that of the 
relation between soul and body, could be discussed for days. This suggests that 
the activities of the school may have resembled those, for example, of Epictetus' 
school, which combined the study of authoritative texts (in Epictetus' case, 
those of Chrysippus, in Plotinus' case, those of Plato) with discussion of various 
philosophical problems. The reading of Platonist and Aristotelian commenta-
tors may have been done in connection with the interpretation of passages in 
Plato and in Aristotle. Plotinus' teaching style, to the irritation of some (3.37— 
8), was very open and undogmatic, very different from the highly structured 
programme followed later in the schools of Athens and Alexandria. Plotinus 
was also assisted by Amelius and Porphyry in dealing with the criticisms of him 
coming from Greece and with the more subversive threat to some members of 
the school represented by Gnosticism (chs. 16-17). 
These activities did not distract Plotinus, in Porphyry's portrayal of him, from 
his concentration on a transcendent life. Always 'there', living the life o£theöria, 
knowledge (8.6 and 19-24), Plotinus was also 'here' (in the realm of praxis, 
action), acting as a respected arbiter and as a guardian attentive to the education 
and material interests of orphans left in his care (9.5 ff). This domestic activity 
might have extended itself, had he been able to realize a project he proposed 
to the Emperor Galienus (both Galienus and his wife held Plotinus in honour) 
to develop an abandoned city in Campania into a city to be called Platonopolis 
and to be governed by 'Plato's laws' (12.1-8). Scholars disagree as to what 
Platonopolis would have been like, but the reference to Plato's laws should not 
be ignored. At any rate the project was not realized. Most important, however, 
was Plotinus' activity as a teacher and the attention to others which this teaching 
implied. 
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This attention extended to writing texts for the members of the school, an 
activity for which Plotinus was not particularly well disposed: he had poor eye-
sight, jumbled words and took no interest in literary form (8.1 ff). At first, in 
Rome, Plotinus wrote nothing. Porphyry associates this in his narrative (3.24 ff.) 
with a mysterious pact made, he says, by Ammonius' students, Plotinus, Erennius 
and Origen, not to divulge Ammonius' teaching (echoes again of Pythagoras!). 
However, the pact was broken and in 254 Plotinus began composing treatises 
(at first relatively brief) in connection with his school lectures. When Porphyry 
arrived in Rome in 263, twenty-one treatises had been written. Porphyry sug-
gests that their circulation was restricted (4.13—14), to the extent that at first 
he was not given access to them (18.20). He credits himself with stimulating 
Plotinus to write more, and indeed the treatises which Plotinus then composed 
gained considerably in extension, depth and freedom of expression. When 
Porphyry left Rome for Sicily in 268 on Plotinus' advice (Porphyry was con-
templating suicide), he received there two batches of treatises written before 
Plotinus died. 
In describing these circumstances, Porphyry provides (chs. 4—6) a chrono-
logical listing of the treatises which seems generally correct: total precision is 
scarcely possible here. The study of the treatises in this chronological order has 
not revealed convincing evidence of major doctrinal development or change in 
Plotinus' thought. The treatises reflect the work in Plotinus' school. They some-
times concern questions or problems which are standard in Platonist schools of 
the period (see for example 5.9 [jj.ioff.; 1.8 [51]. 1), or issues raised by con-
temporary concerns (the threat represented by Gnosticism, for example; see 2.9 
[33]), or relate more to the interpretation of passages in Plato (for example 3.9 
[13].1), these matters being connected in that the solution of a problem may 
be confirmed by a passage in Plato, or the correct reading of a passage in Plato 
amounts to the solution of a philosophical problem. Although the treatises are 
not written as dialogues, they frequently develop as a dialogue of views, one 
view opposing or answering another (perhaps sometimes echoing discussions in 
Plotinus' circle) in an evolving treatment of the theme. This can become quite 
complex and the direction Plotinus wishes to take and his position may not be 
clear in an aporetic exploration reminiscent of parts of Aristotle's Metaphysics.1 
Or the discussion can be quite scholastic, polemical and dialectical in dealing 
with other philosophical schools (for example, the Stoics).8 Or the mood can 
7
 One of Plotinus' favourite expressions, è (which might be translated as: 'Or is it not rather the 
case t h a t . . . ' ) , indicates a new view to be explored, not necessarily his own definitive position (for 
example, 6.9.1.20; 1.5.5.3; 1.8.4.14). 
8
 It is thus quite hazardous to abstract Plotinus' 'doctrine' from passages taken in isolation from the 
aporetic or dialectical progression of thought to which they belong. 
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become protreptic, exhorting us on the way to the Good in passages of great 
poetry. In short, the treatises reflect Plotinus' view of the function and aim of 
philosophy (below, 2(d), v). 
Plotinus' lectures and texts were preserved in other versions before Porphyry 
prepared to bring out his edition. Amelius had 100 volumes of notes (scholai) 
of Plotinus' lectures which he brought to Apamea when he left R o m e in 269. 
Eustochius seems to have published the treatises in some fashion. But Porphyry 
claims that he had been designated by Plotinus as editor of the treatises (8.51; 
24.2—3). This claim is backed up by Porphyry's account of his arrival in Plotinus' 
school in Rome, his conversion to Plotinus' ideas and his important role in the 
school: Plotinus' biography becomes in some places Porphyry's autobiography; 
through Plotinus Porphyry asserts himself as Plotinus' representative. In intro­
ducing his edition of the treatises, Porphyry refers to Andronicus of Rhodes' 
edition of Aristotle and Theophrastus as one of his models (24.6 ff), an edition 
which had involved an ordering of Aristotle's texts in terms of a division of the 
sciences, as well as a work on the life of Aristotle and the order of his works. 
So too does Porphyry write the Life and arrange Plotinus' treatise in terms of 
the sciences, ethics (Enn. 1), physics (Enn. 2—3), and metaphysics9 (Enn. 4—6), 
so that they come to constitute a curriculum leading the mind of the reader 
though successive levels to the highest Good. Porphyry furthermore broke up 
some of Plotinus' treatises so as to reach the number 54, i.e. 6 x 9 , the numbers 
for perfection and totality. The resulting texts were then arranged in six sets 
(1—6) of nine treatises each, i.e. six 'nines' ('enneads'). Here again, Iamblichus 
may be in the background, since he published a Pythagorean curriculum (of 
which On the Pythagorean Life is the first part) in ten books, arranged according 
to the sciences. Porphyry's edition was published in three volumes (codices), as it 
still is in Henry and Schwyzer's critical edition: vol. 1 (Enn. 1—3), vol. π (Enn. 
4-5), vol. m (Enn. 6). 
Porphyry's division and reordering of the treatises has the disadvantage of 
artificially forcing them into a curricular structure. It also dismembered some 
treatises, the parts of which, however, usually follow each other in the edi­
tion (e.g., Enn. 6.4, 6.5), but which, in one case (Enn. 3.8, 5.8, 5.5, 2.9), find 
themselves dispersed in different parts of the edition. However, since Porphyry's 
edition imposed itself in late antiquity and remains our edition, we convention­
ally refer to the treatises by their place in the Enneads (e.g., Enn. 3.8), sometimes 
adding in brackets the number in the chronological list Porphyry supplies (e.g., 
Enn. 3.8 [30]) or even just giving the chronological number (treatise 30). Despite 
9
 I.e. 'theology', as concerning divine beings, Soul (Enn. 4), Intellect (5) and the One (6); on the 
range of the divine as going from the One down to Soul, see 5.1.7.49. 
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the violence done to the treatises, Porphyry does not seem to have tampered 
with the actual text of the treatises — he was sensitive to the particularity of Plot­
inus' writing, adding perhaps in some places brief glosses (but this is uncertain) 
and supplying the treatises with titles which were already current in the school 
or which he composed. The division of the treatises into chapters was made 
much later, by Marsilio Ficino when he published the first complete translation 
(into Latin) of Plotinus in Florence in 1492. 
2 THOUGHT 
It is not possible, in one brief chapter, to do justice to the breadth and depth 
of Plotinus' philosophy. What might be attempted is to sketch something like 
a subway plan which provides orientation and indicates major stations from 
which the reader might emerge (hopefully!) for further explorations in the 
light of Plotinus' own works. In attempting this sketch, I wish to suggest the 
movement of thought whereby Plotinus came upon and explored some of 
the ideas characteristic of his philosophy. A number of these ideas are present 
already in the first group of treatises that Plotinus wrote, before Porphyry's 
arrival in the school: I will refer first to these treatises, before passing to the 
more extensive discussions to be found in treatises composed later.10 
(a) First principles 
Plotinus regarded himself as simply taking up and explaining knowledge which 
had already been attained by some of his predecessors, in particular by Plato (5.1 
[10]* 8—9). Plato, however, is not always clear in what he says (4.8 [6]* i.26ff), 
and Plotinus took account of the variety of interpretations of Plato developed 
before him. In an approach ultimately inspired by Aristotle's description in 
Metaphysics 1 of the extent to which his own predecessors had anticipated his 
theory of first principles (archai) or causes (aitia), Platonists of the second century 
sought to identify Plato's first principles, basing this on their interpretation of 
the making of the world as recounted in Plato's Timaeus. A fairly standard 
approach may be found in Alcinous' school-book (Didaskalikos, chs. 8—10), 
where three first principles are listed: God, the transcendent Forms and Matter. 
1 0
 Plotinus' treatises will be cited according to their enneadic numbering (e.g., 5.1), to which will 
be added, on first mention, their chronological numbering in brackets (e.g., 5.1 [10]) and an 
asterisk (e.g., 5.τ [io]*) for those treatises for which at present a detailed commentary is available 
(see Bibliography). It is best to read Plotinus' treatises as wholes, a task made easier today by the 
availability of commentaries on individual treatises, of which a list is given in the Bibliography 
below. 
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What this involves, as a reading of the Timaeus, is that the world is constituted 
(eternally) from matter formed by a World Soul following the model provided 
by a transcendent god, an Intellect whose thoughts are the transcendent Forms. 
However, in 5.1, Plotinus identifies as first principles, which he takes to be 
those of Plato: Soul, Intellect and the One.11 This list, we note, does not 
include matter. Furthermore, Plotinus' principles do not function as co-ordinate 
constituents of the world, as they do in Alcinous, but the world eternally derives 
from Soul, which derives from Intellect, which derives from the One. We may 
consequently wonder how Plotinus reached his particular list of first principles 
and how it represents what he must regard as a correct interpretation of the 
cosmology of Plato's Timaeus. 
(1) SOUL Beginning with the lowest of first principles, Soul,'2 Plotinus 
describes it in 5.1.2 as that which gives life, structure, unity and value to 
the world, to body. Without it, body would be dead, or rather just darkness, 
the darkness of matter (2.26). Plotinus evokes here Plato's description in the 
Timaeus (30b, 34b) of the world as a living organism, animated and ordered by 
a World Soul, a description taken up also in the Stoic theory of the cosmos 
as structured and driven by an immanent divine life-force. Plotinus notes that 
this conception of soul also concerns our soul, we who think about the world 
(2.49—51), and he affirms that Soul, as cosmic principle or cause, is not a body: 
it acts as one and entire throughout the world and is not spatially divided and 
fragmented as are bodies (2.28—40). 
This last point had been argued a little before, in 4.7 [2]*, where Plotinus 
discusses the question of the immortality of the soul, a theme this time evoking 
Plato's Phaedo. Plotinus notes that to answer the question of immortality we need 
to know what is the nature of soul and he then argues (against materialist views 
such as those of the Stoics and Epicureans) that soul is not a body, and (against 
Aristotle) that soul, as incorporeal, does not depend for its existence on body. 
The arguments are often fairly traditional, coming from the Phaedo and from 
Platonist and Aristotelian criticisms of Stoicism. But they help bring out the 
distinction Plotinus wishes to make between body and soul, a distinction which 
implies not only that soul is not body, but that body depends on soul for whatever 
unity, structure and life it might have. For Plotinus, body is composite, having 
rT
 Modern studies sometimes refer to Soul, Intellect and the One, in Plotinus, as 'hypostases'. How-
ever, Plotinus uses the term hupostasis to refer, not to the One, but to the realities it produces, and 
a better term for all three would be 'principles', as suggested by Gerson 1994: 3. 
12
 For convenience of reference I capitalize soul (and intellect), when referring to the nature of this 
first principle as a whole, a nature which includes a gradation of different souls (World Soul, 
individual souls), just as Intellect contains a gradation of different intellects. 
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mass and occupying space. As composite, it is subject to constant change and, as 
quantitative and spatial, each part of it occupies a particular space such that it is 
divided by space from other parts. But if body is composite, what composes it? 
What organizes it into a functional unity? Neither itself (as what is composed), 
Plotinus claims, nor its constituent parts (also composed, ultimately of the 
elements, themselves composed of matter and form) can act as the organizing 
power (4.7.2). Furthermore, if soul is understood (as it is in Plato's Phaedo and in 
Aristotle's De anima) as the cause responsible for living functions such as growth, 
sense-perception and thought, its power of recognition, for example, suggests 
an identity over time which body, in its constant changing, does not possess 
(4.7.5.20—4). Furthermore, soul's power as one subject perceiving a multiplicity 
of quantitatively and spatially separated objects is not that of which body (alone) 
is capable (4.7.6). Plotinus is pointing to the idea he develops elsewhere (4.9 
[8]; 6.4—5 [22—3]*) that the concepts of one/many, whole/part, as they apply 
to bodies, work quite differently in regard to soul: soul is not one or many, a 
whole or parts, in the way body is. Since it is not quantitatively and spatially 
determined like body, soul can be both one and many, both a whole and parts 
in a way impossible for body. 
(11) INTELLECT The distinction between soul and body becomes, in 4.7.ο­
ίο, a more general distinction between corporeal reality and the transcendent 
intelligible being of which Plato speaks, not only in the Timaeus (27a), but also 
in the Phaedrus (247cd). In 4.2 [4]*, prolonging the discussion in 4.7, Plotinus 
procèdes to refine this two-level structure by subdividing it into four, on the 
basis again of the Timaeus (35a): Soul is divisible in its capacity to be present 
in quantitatively and spatially divided bodies, whereas Intellect (nous) remains 
entirely indivisible; yet while being divisible as present in bodies, Soul remains 
one in its substance, thus undivided, whereas forms in matter are divided over 
bodies and lose this unity, but not to the point of becoming completely divisible 
as are bodies. 
If we return to 5.1.3-4, the distinction between Soul and Intellect is described 
in terms of the knowledge possessed by Soul (which manifests itself in the order-
ing of the world), but which it receives from Intellect. Like earlier interpreters, 
for example Alcinous, Plotinus identifies the god who makes the world in the 
Timaeus as a transcendent Intellect whose thoughts are the Forms which are 
the models inspiring Soul's cosmic ordering. Other interpreters, for example 
Porphyry before he was persuaded to think otherwise (Life 18.8—19), had dis-
tinguished between the divine Intellect and the Forms, either in the sense that 
the Forms were exterior to and independent of Intellect, or in the sense that 
they were thought up by Intellect. However, to secure the truth of Intellect's 
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knowledge of the Forms (see below (c), ii) and the independent reality of the 
Forms, Plotinus felt it necessary to maintain the internality of the Forms in 
Intellect, indeed the identity of the Forms and Intellect. Intellect neither dis­
covers the Forms (with the risks of error this implies), nor invents them (with 
the dependence this means for the Forms), but it is identical to them. This 
identity (here also Plotinus is anticipated by Alcinous in his thesis, if not in his 
explanation of the thesis) is that of Aristotle's divine Intellect, whose activity of 
thinking is identical with its object of thought (Metaphysics 12.7 and 9). Plotinus' 
Intellect is thus an indivisible unity of the activity of thinking and its object 
of thought, in act and not in potentiality, whereas Soul acquires the knowledge 
with which it orders the world from Intellect. Yet the unity of Intellect is also 
a multiplicity, that of the Forms which find their reflection in the determinate 
structures of the world. Each Form is both thought and thinking, an intellect, 
and all are Intellect: the unity-multiplicity of Soul, a unity of which spatially 
divided bodies are incapable, is even more intensive in Intellect, where the 
greatest degree of unity of any multiplicity whatever is reached in the identity 
of thinking and its object (5.1.4.26-33; 5.9 [5]*, 7-9). 
(πι) THE ONE However intense its unity, Intellect remains a united multiplic­
ity. The unity given by the identity of the activity of thinking and its object 
also involves multiplicity in the duality (constitutive of its unity) of thinking 
subject and object thought. Plotinus argues from this that Intellect cannot, as 
Aristotle, Aristotelians, and Platonists such as Alcinous and Numenius believed, 
be considered as an absolutely first principle (5.1.5; already argued in 5.4 [7], 
2; see 5.6 [24]): in being constituted as Intellect, in being constituted as a 
unity/multiplicity, it presupposes such a principle, which, as absolutely first, can­
not be in any degree multiple, but must be absolutely non-multiple, i.e., 'one'. 
The 'One ' is thus the principle presupposed by the constitution of Intellect as 
a unity of thinking and its object of thought, the Forms. Since the 'One ' is 
such, it is neither Intellect nor Form. And since it is the principle of the highest 
degree of composite unity, it is the very first principle. 
Plotinus thinks in 5.1.8 that this first principle is that to which Plato refers 
in the Second Letter (312e) and in the Parmenides (137c ff.). He identifies it 
furthermore with the Form of the Good, which Plato says is 'beyond Being' 
(Republic 509b), since Plato identifies the Forms as true primary being. Plato's 
Form of the Good gives existence in some way to the (other) Forms, but 
we note that Plotinus' One, as that which makes it possible for Forms to be 
constituted, is not itself a Form. The One, as the principle which constitutes all 
else (Intellect, Soul, the world), can be described as the Good, as that on which 
all else depends, which is self-sufficient in itself, dependent on nothing else, in 
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no need, yet giving existence, unity, form and value to all else (1.8 [51]*, 2.1—7; 
see below (c), iv). 
This brief sketch of Plotinus' theory of first principles raises many questions, 
some of which will be considered below. One of these questions concerns 
the sense and way in which Intellect is constituted from the One, Soul from 
Intellect, and the world from Soul. We might wonder also in what way this 
theory can claim to be an interpretation of the cosmology of the Timaeus, from 
which it seems very distant, and what becomes of another of the first principles 
in the lists provided by second-century Platonists, namely matter. 
(b) The constitution of reality 
In 5.1.6.3—6, Plotinus refers to what he takes to be a traditional and much 
debated question: how does the multiplicity of things come from the One? 
In a sense the first Greek philosophers, at least as Aristotle describes them in 
Metaphysics 1, derived the world in all its parts, through various stages, from an 
original material (water, air, fire). However, in later accounts, in Plato himself, it 
seems, as well as in Aristotle and in other philosophers, the world is constituted 
through the combination of various causes. In Plotinus, the question becomes 
particularly radical and difficult, since he holds that everything, by stages, derives 
from one single cause. The attempt to answer this question is made all the more 
difficult in that, as will be seen below, the One is not something which can be 
known or described: how then can we explain its production of everything? 
Since we do know and can describe productive processes at a lower, derived 
level, perhaps these processes might provide an appropriate approach to our 
question. Thus Plotinus refers to the dynamic productivity of nature — the sun 
producing light, fire producing heat — to suggest the implausibility of thinking 
that the power of the One, a power producing everything, could be non­
productive. O n the contrary, in nature, the more powerful and perfect (i.e., 
mature) something is, the more productive it is (6.27—39; s e e 5 ·4 · Ι — 2 ) · The 
examples of light and heat indeed illustrate what Plotinus takes to be a more 
general process, which he applies to the question of the productivity of the 
One, the process whereby a primary activity, for example the activity that is 
fire, is followed or accompanied by a secondary activity, for example the heat 
produced by fire.'3 Plotinus uses this theory of double activity to help with the 
1 3
 Plotinus also uses the example of water flowing from a source, 'emanating'. 'Emanation' is a term 
often used by modern scholars to describe in general the constitution of things from the One 
in Plotinus. However, strictly speaking this is incorrect, since 'flowing' is just one of the natural 
processes which can serve to exemplify a more general constitutive process. We might prefer to use 
the term 'derivation' which, in English, may sound less aqueous and be less misleading. 
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question of how everything, and in the first place Intellect, is produced from 
the One. 
The question as to the sources of Plotinus' theory of double activity has been 
much discussed by scholars, who have traced it back to Stoicism, to Aristotle 
and to Plato. Certainly Plotinus uses Aristotelian terminology, in particular 
that of activity (energeia). And the causal process whereby Aristotle's divine 
Intellect inspires, as an object of love and thought (Metaphysics 12.7), imitation 
in the movements of the celestial spheres, provides Plotinus with a model of 
causality whereby a transcendent immaterial activity can, without being thereby 
affected, elicit the constitution of lower activities which are imitations of it, a 
causal relation which fits well with that required by the way in which Plato's 
Forms function as paradigms for the many evanescent imitations or images of 
them in the sensible world. Plato's view that what is good is unstinting in giving 
of its goodness (Timaeus 29e) and that soul becomes fecund in participating in 
the Forms (Symposium 209a) would also support the idea that what is perfect is 
productive. 
Expressed as a general theory of causality explaining how one thing is con-
stituted by another, Plotinus' theory of double activity takes it that an activity 
which is complete in itself, for example fire as an activity, naturally produces, 
without changing in its activity or being affected by this, a secondary activity 
which accompanies it, for example the heat produced by fire, which depends 
on it (remove the fire, and the heat it produces disappears), and which is a sort of 
image of it. The secondary activity, once constituted, can, in its turn, function 
as a primary activity in relation to a further activity secondary to it. 
(1) THE CONSTITUTION OF INTELLECT Applying this theory of double activity 
to the question of the constitution by the One of Intellect, we can try to 
think of the One as if it were a primary activity from which derives, without 
any change in its activity, a secondary activity which depends on it and is an 
image of it, Intellect. Intellect is constituted to be an image of the One in the 
way in which thinking can be an image of something, by thinking it. So there 
needs to be a potentiality to think, as such indeterminate, actualized or made 
determinate by its object of thinking, the One, thus becoming an image of the 
One. However, as we have seen, the One is beyond all form, all determination, 
all thought, thus not an object that can be the determinate act that actualizes the 
potentiality to think. Thus in desiring to think the One (for Plotinus, thinking 
is a form of desire to reach that which one does not have: 5.6.5.8—10), the 
initially indeterminate potentiality to think the One thinks it, not as it is, but as 
it is thinkable, i.e., as expressed as a determinate multiplicity. This determinate 
multiplicity, as what actualizes the potentiality to think, is identical with the 
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thinking: thinking and what is thought are one. Intellect is thus constituted as 
the attempt to think the One which becomes the self-thought that is Intellect. 
The unlimited, undetermined power of the One finds determinate thinkable 
expression in Intellect's thinking of itself.14 
Plotinus' account of the constitution of Intellect involves many difficulties, 
both exegetical and philosophical. Without going into these here, we might at 
least remind ourselves that what is at stake is our attempt to understand matters 
which transcend the domain of discursive reasoning (below (c), iii). It should 
also be stressed that the process of constitution at issue, despite what might 
be suggested by the account we attempt to give, is not a sequence of events 
taking place in time and space (see 5.1.6.19—22). Time and space are constituted 
after the constitution of Intellect and Soul: they are posterior in the causal 
order. Intellect constitutes itself and is completely constituted from the One, 
atemporally and non-spatially. Finally, we note that Plotinus believes (5.4.2.8—9) 
that his account covers the two first principles that Aristotle attributes to Plato 
(Metaphysics 1.6), the One and the 'indefinite Dyad' which Plotinus takes to be 
the indeterminate potential thinking actualized in Intellect. 
Intellect is united determinate multiplicity comprising a structure of primary, 
general Forms (identified by Plotinus with the 'major kinds' of Plato's Sophist 
254d—255a, i.e., Being, Sameness, Difference, Rest, Motion, 6.2 [43]*), to which 
are subordinated more specific Forms, whose gradation does not weaken the 
systematic unity whereby all Forms are linked together and involve each other, 
in the way, Plotinus suggests, that a body of science involves a network of 
interconnected truths (5.9.8; 10.11—15). However, in contrast to human science, 
where the grasp of a theorem may involve potentially, but not actually, the grasp 
of other theorems and of the whole of the science to which it is linked, on 
the level of Intellect, all Forms will actually link with each other and with the 
whole as a unity. How far does the range of Forms extend? This question, 
a traditional question raised already in Plato's Parmenides and made into an 
acute problem in Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of Forms, is discussed by 
Plotinus in 5.9 [5] 10—14, where he briefly considers whether there are, for 
example, Forms of artefacts, of base things, of individuals. Plotinus returns to 
the question concerning Forms of individuals in 5.7 [18], where he refers, not 
only to human individuals, but also to other animals (3.19). Plotinus' position 
on the question of Forms of individuals is much debated by scholars. It seems 
to be his view that, in general, that which, in the sensible world, is not due 
to matter (see below, iii), deficiencies of various kinds, and which corresponds 
to form, to a determination of some kind, is caused by formal principles, 
1 4
 See 5.1.7; 5.2.1; 3.8 [30].8-n; 6.7 [38]*.15-16; 5.3 [49Γ.10-11. 
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logoi, transmitted by Soul from intelligible reality (see 5.9.10.1-2; 6.7.11.3-4; 
below, iv). 
(11) THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUL Intellect, as activity, produces in turn a sec­
ondary activity, Soul, which Plotinus sees as constituted in a way comparable to 
the constitution of Intellect (5.1.7.36—49; 5.2 [11]. 1.14—18). Soul is therefore an 
expression of Intellect, an image of it. Soul, like Intellect, is a united multiplicity, 
one soul and many souls ordered in a gradation, but linked to each other and 
linked to what constitutes them, Intellect (5.1.10—11). Soul, as image of Intel­
lect, distinguishes itself, in Plotinus' account, by its tendency to project itself, 
to express itself and direct things (4.8.3.25-30; 5.2.1.22-8; 3.4 [15].1.1-3; 3.8 
[30]. 5), a tendency giving rise to the production of the world and the presence 
of soul in the world. Two aspects might be distinguished in the production of 
the world by Soul: its production of matter, and the constitution by Soul of the 
world in matter. 
(πι) MATTER There has been some controversy as to whether Plotinus holds 
that Soul actually produces matter (hule), or thinks that matter exists inde­
pendently of Soul and is not produced by Soul (as is the case, for example, 
in Alcinous). However there is good evidence that Plotinus holds that Soul 
produces matter (1.8.7). Matter is not a first principle, for Plotinus, but the 
very last product in the causal chain constituting reality. Plotinus describes it 
as absolute indétermination, incapacity to receive and retain any form (3.6 
[26]*.7-19; 2.4 [12]*.6-16; 2.5 [25]*.4-5). It is thus neither Aristotelian matter 
(which is actualized by form) nor, one could argue, is it the 'receptacle' of 
Plato's Timaeus (which precontains what will be ordered). Its immunity to any 
form means the impossibility of any actualization of it, or activity. As such, then, 
it is non-productive, the sterile end to the causal chain. It acts as a counterfoil 
to form, weakening, hindering, rendering evanescent the product of Soul, the 
result of which is the world. As absolute 'poverty' of form, Plotinus describes 
it as absolute evil, since it has nothing of the Good (the One) as manifested 
in the activities that are Intellect and Soul (1.8.2—3). As the total absence of 
any good, matter is that in terms of which physical 'evils' arise (e.g., deficien-
cies such as sickness, 4.19—26) and in relation to which moral evil originates 
(below, (d), iv). Plotinus' conception of matter as absolute evil was criticized and 
rejected by his Platonist successors, in particular by Proclus in his De malorum 
subsistentia. 
(iv) THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD Soul's tendency to project and express 
itself means that it seeks to fill the negativity of matter with form. It does this by 
314 Dominic J. O'Meara 
projecting itself as a descending gradation of souls (5.2.2), the lowest level of this 
being Nature, which brings formal principles (logot) to expression in (or rather 
on) matter (3.8.4—5). In describing how Soul produces the world, Plotinus is 
careful to insist that this is not done by a process of fabrication similar to human 
fabrication. Plato's image, in the cosmological account of the Timaeus, of god as 
an artisan, or craftsman ('demiurge'), of the world, modelling it after the pattern 
of the Forms (28c—30a), had been ridiculed by his critics: could the world really 
be the product of a laborious, toiling, calculating god? This literal reading of the 
Timaeus took a sinister turn in the version of it found in a religious movement of 
Plotinus' time, Gnosticism, which saw this world as the botched product of an 
evil and ignorant god, a world from which we, as humans, must escape to return 
to another higher world and a god of goodness. Against Plato's critics and against 
what he thought of as Gnostic perversion of Plato's ideas, Plotinus insisted that 
Soul does not need to labour or calculate in producing the world. The world is 
rather that which effortlessly accompanies the knowledge possessed by Soul. We 
can sense here, at work again, the principle of double activity. In the first part of 
his work directed against Gnosticism (3.8), Plotinus explains this in terms of the 
thesis that action (praxis) and making (poiësis) are what either accompanies or 
substitutes for knowledge (theöria). In the human sphere, Plotinus argues (3.8.4), 
our actions and productions externalize and express our knowledge or are ways 
in which we seek a knowledge that is lacking (4.31—43). Similarly, in nature in 
general, all action and production accompany (as a secondary activity, we can 
add) the knowing activity which is Soul, as the diagrams drawn by the geometer 
accompany his geometrical knowledge (4.4—10). The world is the expression 
of knowledge, not of error or ignorance, and is therefore the expression of the 
Good (3.8.2-3). 
What this involves is that Soul, at its lowest level of self-projection, Nature, 
provides a basic formal structuring in matter on which supervene in bodies, 
as contributing to the ordering of things, individual souls (4.3 [27]*.6.10—17), 
the whole being linked and directed by World Soul in an order that can be 
described as 'providence', a providence expressing through World Soul the 
knowledge or order of Intellect (3.2-3 [47-8]). Bodies, at the lowest level, are 
heapings (sumphorösis) of qualities in matter (6.3 [44]*.8.20; 15, 24fr.; 2.7 [37].3) 
expressive of the formal principles (logo!) mediated by Soul inspired by the 
Forms in Intellect.15 The order given the world by soul is not only spatial, it is 
also temporal: time is conceived by Plotinus as successivity in the life of soul, 
which images the non-temporal, eternal order of Intellect (3.7 [45]*. 11). 
15
 In 6.1 [42]*, Plotinus provides an extensive critique of the Aristotelian and Stoic categories as 
applying to the sensible world. 
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(c) Knowledge 
Knowledge, as can be seen from the above, is not something which merely 
concerns humans: it characterizes all of reality, ranging in the causal order 
from a sort of 'pre-thinking' in the One,16 through Intellect, as the highest 
knowledge of the One, and Soul, as knowledge of Intellect/Forms, down to 
forms in matter, the last expressions of soul's knowledge. There are therefore 
different stages of knowledge linked together in a descending series such that 
lower levels of knowledge depend on and are images of higher ones. We, 
as humans, are integrated in this series, on the one hand, as souls in bodies 
which connect us through sense-perception to the order given to the world 
and its contents by Soul, and, on the other hand, as individual souls which 
are connected as images to individual Forms/intellects in Intellect. The latter 
connection means that, as souls, we remain permanently linked to Intellect; 
a part of us (a claim much contested by Plotinus' successors) stays 'there', in 
Intellect (4.8.8), a part to which we always have access, even if, in our conscious 
lives, we are often unaware of this, being distracted by the cares of material 
existence. 
Before considering this in more detail, a further general point should be 
stressed. Plotinus accepts, as regards knowledge, a principle widely followed in 
Greek philosophy which goes back as far as Empedocles and which Aristotle 
attributes to Plato (De anima 1.2, 404^3—18) and himself accepts with the 
appropriate distinctions, the principle that like is known by like, i.e., that a 
subject attains knowledge of an object by becoming 'like' it in some way (6.9 
[9]*.11.32), the most radical example of which, representing the strongest form 
of knowledge, being the identity of subject and object in Intellect. 
(1) PERCEPTION If we start from sense-perception, in Plotinus' view we do 
not know perceptible things passively, i.e., as being subjected to imprints (tupoi) 
physically caused in us by exterior objects and representing, as images, these 
objects (4.6 [41]). Rather, the soul is active: it comes into contact, through 
sense organs, with the forms in things and the souls or World Soul that mediate 
forms. Thus, for example, in the experience of physical beauty, we, as souls, 
are moved by the sight of beautiful things in that we recognize form in them: 
form, for Plotinus, is what makes perceptible things beautiful (1.6 [i]*.2—3). 
We recognize things as beautiful, we judge them to be beautiful because we 
already know Forms, as souls linked to the Forms in Intellect. Souls rediscover 
themselves and the Forms in Intellect through the perception of beauty. Since 
16
 O n this see 5.4.2; 6.9.6.52; 6.7.37; 6.8.16.32. 
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matter compromises the beauty that is form (5.8 [3i].i), form known free from 
matter, in its original state as Form in Intellect, is pure and primary beauty, the 
beauty of intelligible reality explored by Plotinus, in the second part of his anti-
Gnostic treatise, 5.8 [31], as being the source of the beauty of the world. But 
to reach knowledge of intelligible beauty, soul must become like this beauty: it, 
too, must be purified of the corruption of materiality so as to know intelligible 
beauty as it is (1.6.5). The beauty of soul is moral and intellectual, as it is in 
Plato's Symposium (2iobd). 
(11) INTELLECT In the third part of his anti-Gnostic treatise (5.5 [32]), Plotinus 
wishes to show how Intellect, as source of the world, is not subject to error or 
unreliable, as alleged by Gnostic descriptions of the Demiurge of the world, but 
possesses knowledge in a way excluding any possibility of error or imperfection 
(1.1—6). To introduce this view of Intellect as total and perfect knowledge, 
Plotinus evokes arguments which can already be found in ancient Scepticism's 
attacks on dogmatic philosophy. These arguments distinguish between external 
objects, as they are, and the way we are affected by them, the images we have 
of them in knowing them.17 Following this distinction, it seems that we know 
things, not as they are, but as they affect us, as they appear to us, as the images 
which we have of them. Consequently, we do not know things as they are, 
contrary to the claims of dogmatists. Plotinus evokes these sceptical arguments 
(although, as seen above, he himself does not hold that we know merely images 
of things), in order to show that true knowledge of something must dispense 
with intermediaries, affections (pathe) and images, coming between the subject 
which knows and the object known. Rather than being external to the knowing 
subject, the object known must be internal to it. The internality of the object 
means that the subject's knowledge of it is immune to sceptical arguments. 
Intellect is the strongest, purest level of knowledge, total knowledge, in that it is 
an identity of thinking subject and object thought (5.5.1—2). Sceptical arguments 
reappear later, in treatise 5.3 [49]*, where they serve to put into question 
the possibility of self-knowledge.18 Here again, Plotinus takes advantage of 
these arguments in order to show that self-knowledge is only possible if the 
knower and the known are identical, if the self known is not other than the 
self knowing. Total and perfect knowledge, as exemplified by Intellect, is thus 
self-knowledge (5.3.5). All forms of knowledge must depend, to the extent 
that they are knowledge, on the primary and most intense form of knowledge, 
Intellect's knowledge of itself. 
17
 5.5.1.12—19; see Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.19—20 and 94; 2.51.72. 
18
 5.3.1.1—12; 5, 1—48. See Sextus Empiricus, M. 7.310—12. 
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(m) DISCURSIVE AND NON-DISCURSIVE THOUGHT It is clear from Plotinus' 
account of the perfect thought characterizing Intellect that it is quite different 
from the thinking which we exercise as humans who live in the world and think 
about it. Indeed Plotinus can be understood as elaborating his description of 
Intellect's thought by taking human thought and removing from it whatever 
causes it to be deficient, to be lacking in knowledge or to be mistaken (5.8.4—8; 
5.3.2—9; 1.8.2.9—11). What makes human thinking deficient is the external-
ity of the objects of thought, the recourse to images or impressions and the 
dependence on discursivity, i.e., reasonings, inferential sequences which may 
introduce error.'9 To ensure the absolute truth of Intellect's knowledge, the 
externality of its objects and discursivity must be removed in our description of 
it. However, if Intellect's thought is non-discursive in the sense of not depending 
on fragile conclusions inferred from premisses concerning external objects, it 
nevertheless constitutes a system of truths in the sense that Intellect is a unified 
gradation of Forms/intellects interconnected in such a way that each truth in 
the whole entails every other truth in the whole, a discursive image of which is 
the systematic structure of a science. 
(iv) THE UNKNOWABILITY AND INEFFABILITY OF THE ONE If by starting from 
our way of thinking and negating its deficiencies we might reach a concept of 
the higher way of thinking characteristic of Intellect, we cannot know the One 
over and above the way in which the One is known in Intellect's self-knowledge 
(above (b), i). For the One, as prior to any form or determination, is not such 
a reality as to be an object of knowledge: as it is in itself, it is beyond even the 
highest form of knowledge (6.9.3.36—45). How then can it be known? And if 
language, as Plotinus believes (following Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics), is the 
externalization of thought, then the unknowable One cannot be spoken: it is 
ineffable. How then can we speak of it? 
These questions concerning the limits of thought and language, in relation 
to a reality which goes beyond them, are posed by Plotinus with unprecedented 
clarity. His response to them might be summarized as follows. If the One 
cannot be known and spoken as it is, it can be known and spoken as it affects 
us, as it manifests itself to us in its presence in us.20 The structure of the causal 
chain constitutive of reality means that when something is constituted, what is 
constitutive of it is somehow present in it, while not being part of it. So the 
19
 We should distinguish between the discursivity characterizing soul in its relation to the physical 
world (external objects, inferential sequences) and the discursivity of soul's thinking prior to, and 
independently of, its descent to body (soul's thinking as an image of Intellect's knowledge). 
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 See 6.9.3.49—54; 5.3. T4, on how Plotinus takes advantage here of the sceptical distinction between 
things as they are and things as they affect us. 
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One, as constitutive of Intellect and of Soul, is present in us, to the extent that 
its causal power affects us. Thus when we speak of the 'One ' , we are speaking of 
ourselves as a multiplicity dependent in its existence on something non-multiple. 
And when we speak of the 'Good', we speak of our own deficiency, our lack, 
and of what could remedy this deficiency or lack, what is good/or us (6.34—42). 
To mark these limits in the scope of thought and language as regards what lies 
beyond these limits Plotinus uses the expression 'as if (hoion) when speaking of 
the One (see 6.8 [39]* 13.50). 
(d) The Good 
It has been noted above that in conducting discussions about what produces the 
world, Plotinus keeps in mind the fact that it is we who conduct these discussions. 
These inquiries concern us: knowledge of the world is also knowledge about 
ourselves; in discovering our nature and seeing our position in the structure of 
reality we learn things which matter for the way we conduct our lives in this 
structure. Plotinus may not have been interested in talking about his physical 
genealogy, his physical genos (Porphyry, Life 1.3—4), but he feels that knowing 
one's metaphysical genealogy, one's genos in Intellect (5.1.1.28), is of the greatest 
importance to us, as souls, to the extent that we have forgotten 'where' we 
have come from, who our metaphysical 'father' is, what we are and what our 
purpose is (1.1—29). It is for this reason that Plotinus elaborates in 5.1 his account 
of first principles. This account is a remedy for our self-forgetfulness and our 
consequent confusion about ourselves and about what is of value to us. 
(1) THE SELF Plotinus refers sometimes to 'us' (hëmeis), using this word in a 
quasi-technical sense suggestive of a developed philosophy of the self. If, accord-
ing to Plato's Alcibiades (i29ce), humans are souls using bodies as instruments, 
then 'we' are primarily soul. In Plotinian terms, soul informs body, making it 
into an organic composite, a body ensouled, endowed with a trace of the soul 
producing it (2.3.9; 1 · 1 [53]*·7)· The producing soul may be Nature as what 
produces the basic organism on which supervenes the individual soul (4.9.3; 
4.3.6; 6.7.4—5; 7)· 'We' are then this individual soul, prior to and independent 
of the body, which comes to the body and governs it. Plotinus does not regard 
the presence of individual soul in body as something negative: soul descends 
in a body following its natural tendency to express what it has, its knowledge, 
to organize what is inferior to it through its inherent goodness, its divinity 
(4.8.5.24—7; 3.2.7.23—7). As individual souls present in a body, we can, however, 
in our care for bodily affairs, become so engrossed in these affairs that we come 
to identify ourselves with them, to forget our metaphysical origins and stature, 
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taking corporeal things as of primary value, as Narcissus became infatuated 
with his image and sought to unite himself with it (1.6.8.8—16; 5.8.2.31—5). 
Our self is thus multiple and 'mobile' in Plotinus (3.4 [15]), as has been noted 
by scholars: like a cursor moving on a screen, it identifies itself with different 
things, including things far inferior to it, acting as if it were these things and as 
if they were of primary value. Or it can return to its original self as soul and 
act as such, even to the point of focusing its activity upwards towards that of 
Intellect and living as Intellect, a state Plotinus describes in the famous opening 
lines of 4.8. 
(11) THE GOOD LIFE What does the self desire? What will respond to its need 
and give it rest, self-sufficiency, completion? These questions correspond to a 
central issue discussed in ancient Greek ethics, the issue of eudaimonia: in what 
consists the good life, the best life for humans? In 1.4 [46]*, Plotinus defines 
the good life as the highest or most perfect kind of life. Life itself can range 
(3.i8ff.) from its lowest biological expression, up through different levels of 
soul, to the life of Intellect (1.4.3—4). To the extent then that the human self 
is soul, rational soul as constituted by Intellect, the best life for it is sharing in 
the life of Intellect, living the life of Intellect. In certain respects this concept of 
eudaimonia corresponds to what Aristotle describes as the highest happiness, the 
life oithedria, which is a sharing in the life of the gods (Nicomachean Ethics 10.7) 
which in Aristotle is the life of divine Intellect's self-thought (Metaphysics 12.7). 
But Plotinian eudaimonia evokes also aspects of the perfect life of the Stoic sage, 
who is immune to all passions and the vicissitudes of bodily existence, who 
is complete in the perfection, independence and freedom of his reason. Like 
Aristotle's man of practical wisdom (phronimos) and the Stoic sage, Plotinus' 
good man (spoudaios) is a model of how to lead the good life, a life in which 
Plotinus even finds the pleasure at rest of Epicurean eudaimonia (1.4.12). Such a 
model was provided, Porphyry seems to be suggesting in the Life, by Plotinus 
in his own life. 
(πι) VIRTUE It is commonly assumed in Greek ethics that to live the good life 
is to live virtuously, i.e., to live a life characterized by moral and intellectual 
excellence (arete). This excellence can be described as regards Plotinus as the 
virtue manifested by the good man (spoudaios). However virtue is also required 
in order to become such a spoudaios. Plotinus discusses the latter aspect in the 
early chapters of 1.2 [19]*, distinguishing between levels of virtue in a gradation 
leading up to the life of Intellect. The lowest level of virtue in the gradation 
is that of the four cardinal virtues defined by Plato at the end of Republic 4. 
These virtues, the 'political' virtues (or 'civic' virtues, in Augustine's Latin 
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version) —practical wisdom, courage, moderation and justice — Plotinus regards 
as giving measure, limit, to our desires and passions (1.2.2—3). What is involved 
is soul to the extent to which it directs itself towards bodily concerns and allows 
itself to be drawn away by the unlimitedness, lack of measure, that matter induces 
in these concerns. Limit and measure, as forms coming from Intellect, are in any 
case what should characterize soul's relation to its activities in the body. Soul is 
then brought nearer to the life of Intellect by higher virtues, the purificatory 
virtues mentioned in Plato's Phaedo (69bc). These virtues are wisdom, courage, 
moderation and justice acting now, not as what gives measure, but as what 
concerns soul in itself, purifying it so that it comes nearer to the life of Intellect 
(3 .11-21) . 
(iv) VICE AS virtue concerns the correct relation of soul to body ('political' 
virtue) and the turning away of soul towards the life of Intellect ('purificatory' 
virtue), so, on the contrary, is vice a disorder in soul's relation to the body 
in which it identifies itself with, and allows itself to be dominated by bodily 
passions and desires, to the extent of being infected and drawn to the lack of 
measure, the total indétermination of matter that underlies these passions and 
desires (1.8 [51].4.5—34; 13.18—21). Plotinus believes, however, that soul cannot 
destroy itself in its moral degradation and descent into the complete obscurity 
of evil/matter (1.8.9). Soul remains, in its original self, good and incorruptible: 
it is in its self-projection downwards at its lower levels, in association with the 
body, that vice appears (4.14—32; 14.27—49). 
(v) PHILOSOPHY The return through the grades of virtue to the life of Intel-
lect presupposes habituation and practice (Plato, Republic 7.518e; 1.3 [20].6.6—7; 
2.9.15.14—17). We can imagine that to the extent that philosophical schools 
in late antiquity could function as places of moral education, where members 
found a community aiming at the moral transformation of their lives, Plotinus' 
school may have had the effect of moral habituation in the lives of its mem-
bers. However, the return of soul to the life of Intellect also involves, more 
importantly, soul's discovery of its origins and its nature. Indeed the reaching 
of self-knowledge is a return to the life of Intellect: to know oneself and one's 
origins is to live otherwise. The intellectual instruction practised in Plotinus' 
school can thus be regarded as aiming at bringing souls to self-knowledge, nearer 
to the life of Intellect. Plotinus' treatises reflect this: in exploring philosophical 
problems, in reasoning through puzzles about the world and about soul, in pro-
viding arguments leading towards knowledge, Plotinus' texts help rational soul 
to set aside its confusion and error and reach a better understanding of itself and 
its origin (5.1.1.27—8). His arguments, in his texts, can function as a 'leading up' 
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(anagöge) of soul (1.3.1.1-6) and his teaching and writing as a 'road' and a 'way' 
(6.9.4.15) to the Good. The arguments in Plotinus' texts can take the form of 
discussions, questions, answers, objections, new answers, in an evolving dia-
logue, perhaps originating sometimes in Plotinus' teaching, but now becoming 
a dialogue with and in the soul. To the extent that these arguments and these 
texts are expressions of discursive thinking, they must lead the soul approaching 
the life of Intellect beyond discursivity to the non-discursive knowledge lived 
in and by Intellect (above (b), iii). 
(vi) THE LIFE OF THE SPOUDAIOS If soul reaches the life of Intellect, what does 
such a life imply, in particular for individual soul to the extent that it remains 
in charge, so to speak, of a body? If Plotinus did indeed consider himself to be 
such a soul (4.8.1.iff.), then, to judge from Porphyry's description in the Life, 
while remaining in Intellect, living the life of Intellect, Plotinus also exercised 
'political' virtues such as moderation and justice in his relations with others 
in the limited circle of his school and Gemina s household, and he may have 
planned to extend this in his project of Platonopolis. Plotinus himself suggests, 
not only that the progress from 'political' virtues through the 'purificatory' 
virtues towards the life of Intellect means that the lower virtues are presupposed 
for access to this higher life, but also that the lower virtues remain potentially 
in the soul's possession, being activated as circumstances require (1.2.7.10—12 
and 19—21). These circumstances include presumably what is involved by soul's 
relation to the body, to its own body, to others as bodies ensouled and to other 
parts of the life of the world. Porphyry is perhaps overdoing it when he portrays 
Plotinus as being ashamed of and neglecting his body (Life ch. 1), for Plotinus 
recommends rather taking care of one's body, as is necessary, as the instrument 
of the soul (1.4.4.25—6; 14.19—22; 16.17—19). This can hardly mean misuse and 
mistreatment of the body. The desire to exercise good governance which is 
part of soul's natural goodness may explain why this care for one's own body 
extends further. Soul prior to body and free of body exercises a providential 
action in conjunction with the providential governance of the world by World 
Soul (4.8.2.19—26). If so, then the perfected individual soul, in control of its 
bodily affairs, will also tend to extend its care for lower things, as circumstances 
permit. A further relevant aspect is the original 'sisterhood' of souls, as members 
of the same transcendent community (4.3.6.13; 4.8.3.14—19; 4.9.3.1—9). The 
predicament of souls misdirected and in perdition must concern the good soul 
in a position to act. More generally, applying the principle of double activity, 
we might say that a soul which is good will realize good actions. This aspect of 
Plotinus' ethics might be called an 'ethics of giving'. It is an aspect that has been 
occulted in modern studies through an exclusive emphasis on the otherworldly, 
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religious or mystical side of Plotinus' thought (his 'ethics of escape'). The most 
concrete example of this ethics of giving is Plotinus' own writing, a work surely 
intended as a contribution for the benefit of souls. 
The good soul may undertake good actions, but the occasion and outcome of 
these actions are conditioned by the larger world-context in which these actions 
take place (4.4.43.16—24; 6.8.5.1—27). As in the case of the Stoic sage, Plotinus' 
good soul may find that things turn out otherwise, since the actions take place in 
a domain governed by other causes, in particular and above all by the providential 
order brought about by World Soul. This providential order can be understood 
as a 'law of nature' which ensures cosmic justice. An exemplification of this 
justice is found in the reincarnation of souls through which souls find the just 
consequences of their actions. Matricides, for example, will be born again as 
mothers who will be murdered by their child (3.2.13.14—15). 
(vu) UNION WITH THE GOOD If the life of Intellect represents the closest 
relation to the absolute Good, the One, that can be reached through knowledge, 
the desire of this Good can only be fully satisfied by a union with it going beyond 
knowledge. Porphyry placed at the end (and culmination) of his edition, the 
Enneads, three treatises which lead the reader to the Good, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. In 
these texts Plotinus describes ways of thinking which may serve to lead us to 
the One and in so doing must be surpassed, as must all thought and discourse. 
In following these ways, we remove what separates us from the One, waiting 
in silence on an ultimate union with it which does not seem to involve our 
annihilation (6.9.7; 11-38-42; 6.7.34; 36.6-21). 
Now leaving behind all learning, educated up and established in the beautiful, in which 
he is, up to this stage he thinks. But carried out by the wave, as it were, of Intellect 
itself, lifted up high by it as it swells, so to speak, he suddenly saw, not seeing how, but 
the sight, filling the eyes with light, does not make him see another through itself, but 
the light itself was the sight seen. (0.7.36.15-21) 
The concepts and language which Plotinus uses in evoking the ascent of the 
soul to union with Intellect and then with the One would become very influ-
ential in the mystical traditions of the Islamic world and of medieval Byzantine 
and Latin Christianity. Plotinus himself was interpreting and developing the 
descriptions of the ascent of the soul to the vision of the Forms, of the Form of 
Beauty and the Form of the Good, given by Plato in the Symposium, Phaedrus 
and Republic. Plotinus considered that the means for the ascent of the soul are 
provided by philosophy, which, in leading us to knowledge, leads us to a higher 
level of life. Thus 'theory' and 'experience' are not separated in the soul. The 
ascent of the soul through philosophy is a return to where soul, in its higher 
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part, always is and lives, in Intellect and in its source in the One. In evoking 
this ascent and this higher life, Plotinus does not give the impression that he is 
merely speculating, or guessing. 
(e) Plotinus and later Platonism 
Platonism after Plotinus, as a philosophical movement, was shaped by many 
different influences, by the work of Platonists earlier and later than Plotinus, for 
example by Numenius, Porphyry, Iamblichus, as well as by changing political, 
social and cultural circumstances such as the increasing Christianization of the 
institutions of the Roman Empire. On a number of issues, later Platonists did not 
accept Plotinus' views, his views, for example, on part of the soul as remaining 
in the intelligible world, on matter as absolute evil and the primary cause of evil, 
on time, on Aristotle's categories. Yet we might nonetheless identify some areas 
where Plotinus' contribution was of fundamental importance. Among these 
we might count Plotinus' radical claim that there is one unique first principle, 
the One, constitutive, mediately or immediately, of the existence, order and 
form of all else in reality. The difficulties which this radical claim involved -
how indeed could the diverse multitude of things come from one cause? — 
provoked the development in later Platonism of theories entailing increasing 
complexity in the structure of reality, the recourse to more and more mediating 
levels of being, the use of mathematical concepts of order so as to facilitate 
the transition from the One to the manifold world. And Plotinus' rejection of 
artisanal (demiurgic) accounts of the way in which things are constituted by 
a first principle was decisive in later Platonism, stimulating the elaboration of 
other concepts of constitutive causality. 
In Christian theology, if Plotinus' claim that there is only one truly first 
principle could appear to fit with the belief in God as sole creator, yet this 
creator involved inner complexity, as the Trinity, and the act of creation was 
not that whereby the Plotinian One gives rise to what comes from it, as a 
secondary activity accompanying the primary activity which it is. Nevertheless, 
the Plotinian pattern of the constitution of things from the One by a process 
of derivation from (proodos) and return to (epistrophei) the transcendent first 
cause provided Christian theologians with a way of understanding the relation 
between creator and creation. 
Another area where Plotinus may be considered to have made a fundamental 
contribution is that concerning the transcendence of the first principle. The 
metaphysical transcendence of the One, its unknowability and ineffability, would 
also be emphasized in later Platonism, to the extent that it would lead to the 
negation of any structure of co-ordination linking the One with other levels of 
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being. Yet in pushing this transcendence to its limits, Damascius, for example, 
still stays close to Plotinus' view that in thinking and speaking about the One, we 
are thinking and speaking about ourselves in our deficiency. Both the radical 
transcendence of the Plotinian One, and the recourse to mediating levels in 
later Platonism, would be taken up by Christian thinkers, in particular in the 
Greek-speaking East. 
Finally we might mention Plotinus' practice of philosophy as a way of leading 
the soul to the Good which it desires. Here Plotinus brought the powerful inspi-
ration of Plato to bear on the practical orientation characteristic of philosophical 
schools in the Hellenistic and imperial periods, thus giving considerable impe-
tus to the teaching of Platonism. In later Platonism, however, the formalism of 
scholastic structures and the recourse to other means of ascent, such as theurgy, 
considerably reshaped Plotinus' approach. And, of course, the way for the soul 
to reach the Good in Christian theology would follow other paths than those 
afforded by the study of Plato and the practices of pagan religion. 
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